BY LINDA BENTLEY | FEBRUARY 23, 2011
Defendants ask judge to clarify ruling declaring Obamacare void
‘… because everyone in this country would obviously benefit from certainty and final resolution of the case sooner rather than later’
PENSACOLA, Fla. – On Feb. 18, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) defendants filed a motion in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida for Senior U.S. District Judge Roger Vinson to clarify his Jan. 31 order, in which he held the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) exceeded Congress’ authority and because that provision was not severable from the remainder of the statute, “the entire Act must be declared void.”
The memorandum supporting the motion to clarify stated, “The court’s declaratory judgment potentially implicates hundreds of provisions of the Act and, if it were to be interpreted to apply to programs currently in effect, duties currently in force, taxes currently being collected, and tax credits that may be owed at this time or in the near future, would create substantial uncertainty. Because of the sweeping nature of the declaratory judgment, such an interpretation would pose a risk of substantial disruption and hardship for those who rely on the provisions that have already been implemented.”
HHS argued the court only addressed the standing of two of the 26 plaintiff states regarding the minimum coverage provision, finding Utah and Idaho had standing because they enacted statutes before the ACA became law, which HHS stated “arguably conflict with the minimum coverage.
Even though the court found it had jurisdiction to resolve the merits of the legal issue as to at least one party, HHS asserted it did not “address its authority to grant relief to any, much less all, other parties.”
Even though the court found it had jurisdiction to resolve the merits of the legal issue as to at least one party, HHS asserted it did not “address its authority to grant relief to any, much less all, other parties. The court’s not having addressed with specificity the issue of who is subject to the declaratory judgment further suggests that it was not anticipated that it would provide immediate injunction-like relief pending appeal.”
HHS goes on to say, in issuing a broad declaratory judgment, the court was aware its ruling would have “indeterminable implications,” and gave no indication that it intended or anticipated the specific potential disruption of ongoing programs and operations and the questions that would arise about which parties are bound by the court’s order while the appellate courts resolve constitutional challenges to the ACA.
Noting the court expressly declined to grant injunctive relief enjoining implementation of the Act, HHS stated, “If the court had entered an injunction, its order would have been required to be ‘specific in terms’ and to ‘describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained,” a requirement HHS asserted is “designed to prevent precisely the sort of confusion” that can arise from “a vague district court order.”
HHS moved for the court to “clarify that its judgment indeed does not, pending appellate review, relieve the parties in this case of any rights or obligations under the ACA,” and stated, “If the court disagrees with defendants’ understanding and instead issues an order stating that it did, in fact, anticipate its judgment to have immediate injunction-like effect, defendants will consider how to respond pending appellate review, including whether to seek a stay pending appeal. Otherwise, defendants will proceed based on their understanding of the judgment as reflected above.”
Vinson wasted no time responding and issued an order on Feb. 18 to direct expedited filing.
He wrote, “On Jan. 31, 2011, I entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (in part) and declaring unconstitutional the individual mandate provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Because I determined that the individual mandate could not be severed from the remainder of the Act, it was also necessary to declare the entire statute void. The defendants have now, two and one-half weeks later, filed a motion to ‘clarify’ that order. They have represented that the plaintiffs oppose their motion.”
Vinson said local rules of the court would ordinarily provide plaintiffs 14 days in which to respond to the defendants’ motion.
“However,” Vinson stated, “because time was of the essence in this matter, and because everyone in this country would obviously benefit from certainty and final resolution of the case sooner rather than later, I do not think it necessary or appropriate to adhere to the briefing schedule that would normally apply.”
He then gave plaintiffs three business days from the date of his order in which to file their response in opposition to the defendants’ motion and said if the defendants wish to reply to that response they too would have three business days from the date that response is filed.
Vinson wrote, “I will promptly consider the motion and their memoranda at that time.”
